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Introduction 
A recent article in the American Journal of Public 
Health noted the high correlation between the lead content 
of soil in urban areas and the elevated blood-lead levels of 
children in these cities . ' An editorial in the same issue of the 
Journal suggested that the "use of leaded gasoline and [high] 
traffic density" he lped explain th is observation.2 For most 
public health expe rts, the controversy over the possible 
adverse effec ts of leaded gasoline began in the 1970s. What 
we intend to show in this pa per is that as early as the 1920s 
public health experts , government officials, scientists, cor-
porate leaders, labor, and the public were acutely aware of 
the dangers posed by the introduction of lead into gasoline. 
The depth of concern was manifes ted by the fact that leaded 
gasoline was banned in New York Cit y for over three years 
and in many states and other municipalities for shorter 
periods of time. In 1925, the production of leaded gasoline 
was halted for over nine months, 
During the 1920s, the petrochemical and automobile 
industries emerged as the corporate backbone of the United 
States. Because the acceptance or rejection of leaded gaso~ 
line had profound implications for these industries . a spirited 
and often heated controversy arose. Public health profes-
sionals found themselves under intense pressure to sanction 
and minimize the hazards associated with the manufacture 
and use of this new potentially (oxic substance and the pages 
of the American Journal of Public Health were compro-
mised during the months and years when the fate of leaded 
gasoline was being decided. The debates of that era centered 
on issues of health and public policy that remain current 
today. Numerous questions arose regarding the evaluation 
of health hazards assoc iated with new and potentially harm~ 
fu l substances, including: How can scientists evaluate the 
relative importance of acute and chronic effects of toxic 
subs tances? What should constitute adequate proof of safe ty 
or harm? What business, profess ional, or government agen~ 
des should be responsible for evaluating possibly dangerous 
substances? How does one study potentially toxic s ub~ 
stances while protect ing the right to health of human sub-
jects? Does industry have to prove a new substance safe or 
do public health experts have to prove it dangerous? In the 
face of scientific uncertainty concerning the safe ty or dan-
gers posed by leaded gasoline , and the perceived need for 
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this substance by the au tomobile industry , the broader 
question became: What was the level of acceptable risk that 
society should be willing to assume for industrial progress'? 
By examining this controversy. we will illustrate how, a t 
every stage of the debate , the political, economic, and 
scientific issues were inextricably intertwined . 
Leaded Gasoline Developed 
Before the 1920s. the automobile industry was expand· 
ing and highly competitive. In addition to national manufac~ 
turers such as Ford , General Motors, and Studebaker, there 
were local companies , sometimes arising out of former 
bicycle manufac turers, that competed for special markets. 
Ford dominated the pre ~ 1920 market , however , producing 
nearly half of all the cars bought by Ame ricans. Its Model T, 
small and cheaply produced, was the standard for the 
industry. In the 1920s. General Motors developed a number 
of marketing and stylistic innovations that al10wed it to 
replace Ford as the number one producer by the end of that 
decade. Alfred Sloan, pres ident of General Motors, ex-
plained that their strategy called for creating demand "not 
for basic transportat ion, but for progress in new cars for 
comfort , convenience, power a nd style. " Central to the 
creation of powerful and large automobiles was the develop-
ment of a more effic ie nt fue l capable of driving cars at 
greater speed . In 1922, Thomas Midgley and co-workers at 
the General Motors Research Laboratory in Dayton , Ohio 
discovered that adding tetraethyl lead to gasoline raised the 
compress ion and hence, speed , by eliminating the engine 
" knock". This allowed for the development of the " mod-
ern " automobile produced over the next 50 years .) 
General Motors, which had an interlocking directorship 
with the DuPont Chemical Company, quickly contracted 
with DuPont and Standard Oil of New Jersey to produce 
tetraethyl lead. Leaded gasoline was placed on sale in 
selected markets on February I, 1923. In 1924, DuPont and 
General Motors created the Ethyl Corporation to market and 
produce its final product. This was done in spite of the fact 
that industrial hygienists such as Alice Hamilton had long 
since identified lead as an industrial toxin ..... ' 
Scientisls Question Safety 
In the very year that Midgley and his co-workers at 
General Motors Research Corporat ion heralded the discov-
ery of this powerful ant i~k nock compound , scientists in and 
outside of government warned that telr'dethyllead might be a 
potent threat to the public 's health . Wil.liam Mansfi eld Clark, 
a professor of chemistry , wrote to A. M. Stimson , Assistant 
Surgeon General at the Public Health Service, in October of 
1922 warning of "a serious menace to the public health. " He 
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noted that in the early production of tetraet hyl lead . "several 
very serious cases of lead poisoning have resulted." He 
feared that its use in gasoline would result in environmenta l 
pollution, theorizing that "on busy thoroughfares it is highly 
probable that the lead oxide dust will remain in the lower 
stratum. "8.9 
Stimson believed that " the possibilities of a real health 
menace do exist in the use of such a fuel and it is deemed 
advisable that the Service be provided with some experimen· 
tal evidence lending to support this opinion. " He suggested 
that it was in the province of the Division of Chemistry and 
Pharmacology to conduct investigations of the dangers,lO·11 
The director of that division opposed this suggestion because 
such an investigation would take " a considerable period of 
time, perhaps a year," and that the results would be of little 
" practical use since the trial of the material under ordinary 
conditions [of useJ should show whether there is a risk to 
man." He recommended instead that the Public Health 
Service depend upon industry itself to provide them with 
relevant data. 12 
One month later , H . S. Cumming, the Surgeon General, 
wrote to P. S . DuPont , Chairman of the Board of the DuPont 
Company, asking whether the public health effects of tetra-
ethyl lead manufacturing and use had been taken into 
account. He was answered by Thomas Midgley himself who 
allowed that although the question " had been given very 
se rious considera tion . .. no actual experimental data has 
been take n." Despite the lack of experimental data, OM and 
DuPont were confident that " the average stree t will proba-
bly be so free from lead that it will be impossible to detect it 
or its absorpt ion . "13. 1" 
DuPont and General Motors recognized that , in view of 
the apprehension about the potential health hazards of 
tetraethyl lead, a purely private in-house study of its safety 
would be met by skepticism and rejection. Therefore. rather 
than conduct its own investigations, it worked a ut an agree-
ment with the US Bureau of Mines. The agreement called for 
the General Motors Resea rch Corporation to provide fund-
ing for an investigation of the dangers of tetraethyllead and 
for the Bureau of Mines to provide the faci lities and the 
imprimatur of the US Government on the results of such an 
investigation. GM . through its prime negotiator, Charles 
Kettering, requested one other proviso: that " the Bureau 
refrain from givi ng out the usual press and progress reports 
during the course of the work, as [OM] feels that the 
newspapers are apt to give scare headlines and false impres-
sions before we definitel y know what the influe nce of the 
material will be,"1 3 
Corporate Veto and Censorship 
It was clear t.o many that this was a politically explosive 
inquiry. For example, the chief chemist , S. C, Lind, wrote 
to the superintendent of the Pittsburgh Bureau of Mines 
Field Station where the investigation was being carried out 
objecting to the government 's use .of the trade name "ethyl" 
when referring to tetraethyl lead gasoline, saying, "Of 
course their [G M's] abject in doing so are fairly clear, and 
among other things they are nat particularly desirous .of 
having the name ' lead ' appear in this case, That is alright 
from the standpoint of the General Matars Campany but it is 
quite a questian in my mind as to whether the Bureau of 
Mines wauld be justified in adopting this name so early in the 
game before it has had the support of popular usage." The 
superintendent replied that the avaidance of "the use .of 
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' lead ' in the in terbureau correspondence" was intentional 
because of leaks to the newspapers. Since the Bureau had 
agreed to a blackout of information, he asserted that " if it 
should happen to get some publicity accidentally , it would 
not be sa bad if the word ' lead' were .omitted as this term is 
apt to prejudice somewhat against its use, " 16.17 
The willingness of the Bureau of Mines to avoid publici-
ty and even accurate scientific terminology in favor of a 
trade name reHected the Bureau's weak position vis-a-vis 
the gian t corporations, GM and DuPont. This was further 
evident in the ubsequent agreements developed between 
the government , OM , DuPont, and the newly created Ethyl 
Gasoline Corparation. The first agreement in September 
1923 between the General Mators Research Corporat ian and 
the Bureau allowed relative freedom farthe Bureau ta report 
its final conclusions , IS However, by June 1924, General 
Motors saught much greater control over the final product. 
Not only had the corporation demanded that no publicity 
cancerning the research be given to the popular press, it now 
added ta the contract the stipulation that "all manuscri pts , 
before publication , will be submi tted to the Company for 
camment and crit icism."ISI Two months after the Bureau 
acquiesced ta th is new stipulation, tbe newly created Ethyl 
Corporation asked tha i their proposed contract be modified 
so that " before publication of any papers or articles by your 
Bureau, they should be submitted to them [Ethyl] for 
comment. criticism, and approval." These changes were 
incorporated into the new contract givi ng the Ethyl Corpara-
tian veta power aver the research of the U niled States 
Government.10 
Despite the insistence of OM, DuPont , and the US 
Gavernment that na information should be released before 
completion of the study, it is clear from the unpublished 
correspondence thai this agreement was vialated when it 
appeared that the preliminary results painted taward a 
vindicatian of the companies ' faith in tetraethyllead. In Ju ly 
1924-twa years after leaded gasoline was fi rst put on the 
market in the mid-west and the east coast and five months 
befare the preliminary report was released-the GM director 
of research . Oraham Edgar, wrote to Dr. Paul Leech of the 
American Medical Association that the results of the Bureau 
.of Mines ' research wauld show "that there is no danger of 
acquiring lead paisoning through even prolanged expasure 
to exhaust gases .of cars using Ethyl Gas." He further 
assured the AMA that I'poisoning [rom carban manaxide 
wauld ari se long before the concentration of lead wauld 
reach a point where even cumulative poisaning is to be 
feared. " 2 1 
Oil Company Disaster 
The industry'S assurances of the safety of leaded gaso· 
line were undermined by a horrifying disaster that occurred 
in the Standard Oil Company' s experimental labaratories in 
Elizabeth. New Je rsey. Between October 26 and October 30, 
1924, five workers died and 35 others experienced severe 
palsies , tremars, ha lluc inat ions, and a ther serious neurolagi-
cal symptams of organic lead poisaning. Thus, of 49 warkers 
in the tetraethyllead processing plant , aver 80 per cent died 
or were severel y poisaned. On the first day, the New York 
Times quated the company doctor who suggested that 
" nothing aught to be said abaut this matter in the public 
interest ," and .one of the supervisars at the Bayway facility 
who said " these men probably went insane because they 
worked lOa hard ." The father of the dead man, however, 
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"was bitter in denunciation of conditions at the plant" and 
told reporters that .. Ernest was told by the doctors at the 
plant that working in the laboratory wouldn 't hurt him. 
Otherwise he would have quit. They said he'd have to get 
used to it.' '22.23 
After this initial revelation , every major newspaper in 
New York began to report on conditions at the plant. Day 
after day, the Times. the New York World , and other 
newspapers revealed deaths and occupationally related in-
sanity due to what the newspapers called " Iooney gas" , 2. 
The company continually sought to deny management 's 
responsibility for the tragedy. At a press conference, Thom-
as Midgley asserted that true responsibility for the crisis 
rested with the workers. He said that at another plant "the 
men, regardless of warnings and provision for their protec· 
tion, had failed to appreciate the dangers of constant absorp· 
tion of the fluid by their hands and arms,"n Despite Stan-
dard Oil 's attempt to shift blame to workers, others were 
reaching different conclusions. The Union County (New 
Jersey) prosecutor asserted that he was "satisfied many of 
the workers did not know the danger they were running. I 
also believe some of the workers were not masked nor told 
to wear rubber gloves and rubber boots. "26.27 The New 
lersey Commissioner of Labor said he had never been 
informed that the workers in the Bayway plant were poten-
tiaJly in danger. " Secrecy surrounding the experiments was 
responsible for the Labor Department 's lack of knowledge of 
them," an official said.28 
These deaths and the continuing controversy stimulated 
renewed concern about the potential public health dangers 
from the exhaust produced by leaded gasoline. Despite 
Standard Oil's assurance that no "perils existed in the use of 
this gas in automobiles," New York City, New York State, 
Philadelphia, and many other municipalities and states 
banned the sale of leaded gasoline. 29 
Bureau of Min es Report Issued 
On the day after the fifth and last victim died , and in the 
midst of growing public skepticism about this new chemical, 
the Bureau of Mines released its preliminary findi ngs on the 
possible dangers of leaded gasoline to the general pUblic. 
The New York Times headline summed up the report: 
" No Peril to Public Seen in Ethyl Gas/ Bureau of Mines 
Reports after Long Experiments with Motor Exhausts! More 
Deaths Unlikely. JI 
The Times also reponed " the investigation carried out 
indicates the danger of sufficient lead accumulation in the 
streets through the discharging of scale from automobile 
motors to be seem ingly remote ." In short, the report exoner· 
ated tetraethyl lead .)O Despite the desire of the manufactur· 
ers to use the report to reassure the public, the circum-
stances of the workers ' deaths only served to undermine the 
credibility of the Bureau of Mines ' findings. Specific criti-
cisms came from a number of different sources. Scientists 
and labor activists alike found fault with the report. E. E. 
Free, editor of the prestigious Scientific: American magazine, 
was skeptical ofR. R. Sayers' assurances that the Bureau of 
Mines could find no evidence of lead poisoning in experi. 
mental animals .)1.l2 Cecil K. Drinker, editor of the Journal 
of Industrial Hygiene and professor of public health at 
Harvard, and Dr. David Edsall , Dean of the Harvard Medi-
cal School , were also critical. In early January 1925, Drinker 
wrote a pointed letter to Sayers in which he concluded, "As 
an investigation of an important problem in public health 
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upon which a great deal of inexact data has already ap-
peared , the report is inadequate," l3-).1 Alice Hamilton con· 
curred with Drinker' s position and noted the " desirability of 
having an investigation made by a public body which will be 
beyond suspicion. " ) 11 
Dr. Allee Ilamiiton , (left) one of the country's foremost authorit ies on lead, 
opposed tetraethyllead In gasoline, while R. R. Sayers (right), who headed the 
Bureau of Mines, Issued the preliminary report exone.ratlng tetraethyllead as a 
hazard 10 the public. 
Perhaps the strongest criticism of the Bureau of Mines' 
report came from the Workers ' Health Bureau and one of its 
chief scientific advisors , Yandell Henderson , Professor of 
Applied Physiology at Yale University. Even before the 
report was issued, the Workers' Health Bureau-an organi-
zation of pro-labor activitists devoted to investigating and 
organizing around occupational safety and health issues-
called for a united stand to oppose lead in gasoline . They 
pointed out that the crisis at Bayway indicated tbat both 
workers and the general public were in danger of lead 
poisoning, if lead were allowed to remain in gasoline. )7. )8 
Henderson, upon whom the Workers' Health Bureau de· 
pended for much of their information about the dangers of 
tetraethyl lead, voiced the public health profession ' s nagging 
fear regarding the fact that "this investigation is financed by 
the Ethyl Gas Corporation" and that in spite of many 
protests "the investigators in the Bureau of Mines have used 
experimental conditions which are fundamentally unsuited 
to afford information on the real issues. " ) 9 In addition, he 
said, " it seems to me extremely unfortunate that the experts 
of the United States Government should be carrying out this 
investigation on a grant from the General MOlors." He felt 
" very strongly that there is the most urgent need for an 
absolutely unbiased investigation ."40 C. W. Deppe, owner 
of a competing molor car company, was much more blunt in 
his criticism of the government's relationship to GM , saying: 
"May I be pardoned if I ask you frankly now, does the 
Bureau of Mines exist for the benefit of Ford and the G.M. 
Corporation and the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, and 
other oil companies parties to the distribution of the Ethyl 
Lead Dopes, or is the Bureau supposed to be for the public 
benefit and in protection of life and health?"'" 
Propaganda Efforts 
This attack by scientists, public heaJth experts, and 
activists on the quality and integrity of the report forced 
those who favored the introduction of lead into gasoline to 
begin a counter offensive. Emery Hayhurst, a noted industri· 
al hygienist with the Ohio Department of Health , emerges as 
one of the key figures in the attempt to "sell " tetraethyllead 
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to the American public. Hayhurst was important in the 
foUowing months and years because of his established 
reputation as a respected and independent industrial hygien· 
ist. But what was not known about Dr. Hayhurst during the 
months of struggle around this issue was the dual role he 
played in the controversy; at the same time he was advisi ng 
organizations like the Workers · Health Bureau about indus· 
trial hygiene matters. he was also working as a consultant for 
the Ethyl Corporation."2 It is also evident from correspon· 
dence between Hayhurst and the Public Health Service that 
Hayhurst was supplying advocates of tetraethyl lead with 
information regarding the tactics to be used by their oppo· 
nents. Indeed, even before the Bureau of Mines had issued 
its report, Hayhurst had decided thattelraethyllead was not 
an environmental toxin . He had advised the Bureau of Mines 
lo include a slalemenl that " lhe finished producl, Ethyl 
Gasoline, as marketed and used both pure or diluted in 
gasoline retains none of the poisonous characteristics of the 
ingredients concerned in its manufacture and blending. ""2.0 
Even more damning evidence is found in another letter to 
Sayers-when the attacks on the report were mounting-
wherein Hayhurst secretly sent to the Public Health Service 
copies of the critici sms that the Workers ' Health Bureau had 
developed , so that the federal government could be prepared 
to reply. Although the Workers' Health Bureau had specifi-
cally refrained from sending these comments to the govern-
ment, Hayhurst violated their trusL""-'" Hayhurst and Say· 
ers a1so worked together to build public and professional 
support for the Bureau of Mines ' and the Elhyl Corpora-
tion's position that tetraethyl lead was not a public health 
danger. Sayers urged4S that Hayhurst counter the criticisms 
of Drinker and Edsall with a review or editorial of his own in 
support of the report. Hayhursl replied" lhal he had pre-
pared an editorial for the American Journal of Public 
Healt"· that proclaimed, "ObservationaJ evidence and re· 
ports to various health officials over the country ... so far 
as we have been able to find out. corroborated the statement 
of 'complele safety· so far as the public heallh has been 
concerned.'·"9 Printed as an unsigned editorial , it gave 
Journal readers the impression that public health profession-
als had delermined that leaded gasoline posed no lhreal to 
the public's health. 
Nevertheless, lhis propaganda e!fort did not quell the 
doublS aboul the safely of leaded gasoline or the inlegrilY of 
the Bureau of Mines ' report . It also became apparent that 
the companies were engaging in a cover·up of other deaths 
and illnesses among their workers in other plants. In light of 
the publicity over Bayway, it was soon reported that other 
workers had died handling letraethyllead at bOlh the DuPont 
chemical plant at Deepwater, New Jersey and the General 
Motors research division site in Dayton . Ohio. The Workers' 
Heallh Bureau, for example, began 10 catalogue the dealhs 
and illnesses of workers at these plants showing that, since 
September 1923, al least lwo men had died al Daylon and 
four olhers at Deepwater. 211 ."1 The Times later reported that 
editors and reporters had difficulties in following up on the 
story. For example, the Times noted that there was nothing 
in the local paper about the dealh of Frank W. (Happy) Durr 
who had worked for DuPont for 25 years. Durr had literally 
given his life to the company; he had begun working for 
DuPont as a 12·year·old child and died from exposure to 
lelraethyllead at the age of 37. The edilor oflhe Record told 
the Times: " I guess the reason we didn ' t print anything 
-He was a member or the Joumal's Editorial Committee at the time. 
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about DUfr's death was because we couldn 't get it. They 
[DuPonl] suppress things aboul the lead planl al Deepwaler. 
Whatever we print, we pick up from the workers." The 
Times went on to describe the control that DU.Pont exercised 
over the local hospital to which its poisoned workers were 
sent, indicating that it was almost impossible to get informa· 
tion from the hospital about the source of the workers ' 
problems. Despite this . the Times was able to uncover the 
fact that there had been over 300 cases of lead poisoning 
among workers at the Deepwater plant during the past two 
years. Workers at the DuPont facility ) knowing something 
was amiss, had dubbed the plant '·lhe House of the BUller-
flies" because so many of their colleagues had hallucinations 
of insects during their bouts of lead poisoning: "The Victim 
pauses, perhaps while at work or in a rational conversation, 
gazes intently at space and snatches at something not 
there." The Times reported that "aboul 80% of all who 
worked ' the House of the Butterflies; or who went into it to 
make repairs were poisoned , some repeatedly. "jO 
Surgeon General Convenes Conference 
As a result of these continuing revelations and public 
disquiet over the Bureau of Mines report , the Surgeon 
General of the Public Health Service contemplated calling a 
national conference to assess the tetraethyllead situation. In 
a frank letter to the Surgeon General , Haven Emerson, the 
eminent public health leader, spelled out the concerns of 
public health officers. Emerson stated that the Bureau of 
Mines' report was having "a widespread, and to my mind 
harmful , influence on public opinion and the actions of 
public agencies" and that it would be "well worthwhile to 
call those whom you intend to a conference promptly." He 
feared that there was a growing impression that the interests 
of those who may expecl profit from the public sale of 
tetraethyl lead compounds have been influential in postpon· 
ing such a meeting. j, Despite some indication that R. R. 
Sayers opposed such a conference and may have delayed 
it,j2 the Surgeon General announced at the end of April 1925 
that he was calJing together experts from business , labor, 
and pubHc health to assess the tetraethyl lead situation .5) 
The conference convened on May 20, 1925 in Washing-
ton. DC, with every major party represented. At the confer· 
ence, the ideologies of the different participants were clearly 
and repeatedly laid out , thus providing an important forum 
by which we can evaluate the scientific, political , economic, 
and intellectual issues surrounding this controversy. In the 
words of one participant, the conference gathered together 
in one room " two diametrically opposed conceptions. The 
men engaged in industry, chemists, and engineers. take it as 
a matter of course that a little thing like industrial poisoning 
should not be allowed to stand in the way of a greal induslrial 
advance. On the other hand, the sanitary experts take it as a 
matter of course that the first consideration is the health of 
the people. "54 
'Industrial Progress' Invoked 
The conference opened with statements from General 
Motors, DuPonl. Slandard Oil , and the Elhyl Corporalion 
outlining the history of the development of leaded gasoline 
and the reasons why they believed its continued production 
was essential. Three themes emerge as central arguments by 
the companies. First, the manufacturers maintained that 
leaded gasoline was essential to the industrial progress of 
America. Second, they maintained that any innovation en· 
tails certai n risks . Third, they stated that the major reason 
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that deaths and il lnesses occurred at their plants was that the 
men who worked with the materials were careless and did 
not foHow instructions. 
C. F . Keltering, of GM and Ethyl, and Robert Kehoe, 
scientific consultant to the industry, both stressed the impor-
tance of tetraethyllead as a means of conserving motor fuel. 
But Frank Howard, representing the Ethyl Gasoline Corpo-
ration , provided the most complete rationale for the contin-
ued use of tetraethyl lead in gasoline . He noted that it was 
not possible to abs tract the quest ions of public health from 
broader economic and political issues. "You have but one 
problem," he remarked rhetorically. " Is this a public health 
hazard?" He answered that " unfortunately, our problem is 
not that simple." Rather he posited that automobiles and oil 
were central to the industrial progress of the nation, if not 
the world. "Our continued development of motor fuels is 
essential in our civilization." he proclaimed. Noting that at 
least a decade of research had gone into the effort to identify 
tetraethyl lead, he called its discovery an "apparent gift of 
God." By casting the issue in this way, Howard put the 
opposition on the defensive, making them appear to be 
reactionaries whose limited vision of the country 's future 
could permanently retard progress and harm future genera-
tions . " What is our duty under the circumstances?", he 
asked. " Should we say , 'No, we will not use' .. a material 
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that is "a certain means of saving petroleum? Because some 
animals die and some do not die in some experiments, shall 
we give this thing up entirely?"S!I.s6 
The stark portrayal of tetraethyl lead as a key to the 
industrial future of the nation led naturally into industry's 
second argument that any great advance required some 
sacrifice. Dr. H. C. Parmelee, editor of Chemical and Mewl-
lurgicai Engineering. stated , "The research and develop-
ment that produced tetraethyl lead were conceived in a fine 
spirit of industrial progress looking toward the conservation 
of gasoline and increased efficiency of internal combustion 
motors." Parmelee believed that the companies did their 
best to safeguard the workers. In the end , he said. " its 
casualties were negligible compared to hUman sacrifice in 
the development of many other industrial enterprises. "H-59 
Companies Say Workers at Fawt 
The final part of the industries' position was that 
workers. rather than the companies, were at fault for the 
tragedies at Bayway, Deepwater, and Dayton . Acknowledg-
ing that there were "certain dangers" inherent in the produc-
tion of this essential industrial product , the Standard Oil 
Company asserted that "every precaution was taken" by the 
company to protect their workers. Thomas Midgley, Jr. , 
vice president of General Motors and known as " the Father 
of Ethyl Gas ," was more pointed at the conference. He said 
that the lesson that the companies had learned out of this 
whole experience was that "the essential thing necessary to 
safely handle [tetraethyl lead] was careful discipline of our 
men ... [tetraethyl lead] becomes dangerous due to care-
lessness of the men in handling it." In an earlier statement to 
the New York World. Midgley explai ned what this discipline 
consisted of: "The minute a man shows signs of exhilaration 
he is laid off. If he spills the stuff on himself he is fired. 
Because he doesn' t want to lose his job, he doesn't spiH it." 
Midgley's own recklessness was revealed at a news confer-
ence in which he sought to downplay the toxicity oftetraeth-
yllead. When asked by a reporter if it was dangerous to spill 
the chemical on one 's hands. Midgley dramat ically "had an 
attendant bring in a quantity of pure tetraethyl " with which 
he " washed his hands thoroughly in the fluid and dried them 
on hi s hankerchief. 'I'm not taking any chance whatever; he 
said . 'Nor would r take any chance doing that every day.' .. 
He did this act in spite of the fact that only a year before he 
had laken a prolonged vacation in Florida in order to cure 
himself of Le ad poisoning.!I8·60·61 
A Public Health/Environmental Issue 
Those who opposed the introduction of leaded gasoline 
disagreed with every fundamental position of industry repre-
sentatives. First. opponents pointed out that what we would 
now denote as inorganic lead compounds were already 
known to be a slow, cu mulative poison that should not be 
introduced into the general environment. Second, they be-
lieved because of industry'S reckless disregard for workers' 
and the public's health the federal government had to 
assume responsibility for protecting the health of the nation. 
Third , they rejected the notion that the workers were the 
ones responsible for thei r own poisoning. Fourth . and most 
importantly, because they believed that the public's health 
should take precedence over the needs of industry, they 
argued that the burden of proof should be on the companies 
to prove tetraethyllead was safe rather than on opponents to 
prove that tetraethyl lead was dangerous . 
Dr. Yandell Henderson, Yale physiologist , was the 
strongest and most authoritative critic of industry. He told 
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the conference that lead was a serious public health menace 
that could be equated to the serious infectious diseases then 
affect ing the nation's health. Unl ike industry spokespeople 
who defined the problem as one of occupational heal th and 
maintained that individual vigilance on the part of workers 
could solve the problem, Henderson believed that leaded 
gasoline was a public health and environmental health issue 
that required federal action. He expressed horror at the 
thought that hundreds of thousands of pounds of lead would 
be deposited in the streets of every major ci ty in America. 
His warning to the conference of the long-term dangers 
proved to be an accurate prediction: " condi tions would 
grow worse so gradually and the development of lead 
poisoning will come on so insidiously . . . that leaded 
gasoline will be in nearly universal use and large numbers of 
cars will have been sold . . , before the public and the 
government awaken to the situation . " 62,-64 
To meet such a public healt h menace, Henderson and 
other critics believed that it was essential for the federal 
government to take an active role in controlling leaded 
gasoline. Harriet Silverman of the Workers ' Health Bureau 
attacked the idea put forth by industry that the workers were 
responsible for their own poisoning, saying " I ask you 
gentlemen to consider the fact that you are asked to allow a 
man to be subjected to contact with a poison which is 
considered hazardous by the leading scientists of the coun-
try. And when you expose them to the poison out of which 
the manufacturers are making profits. the manufactu r-
ers penalize those men by maki ng them forfeit a day's 
wage. "flS-61 
Opponent were most concerned , however, about the 
industry propaganda that equated the use of lead wi th 
industrial progress, and the survival of our civiliza tion itself. 
Reac ting to the Ethyl Corporation representative 's state-
ment that tetraethyl lead was a " gift of God", Grace 
Burnham of the Workers' Health Bureau said it " was not a 
gift of God when those 1 1 men were killed or those 149 were 
poisoned ." She angril y questioned the priori ties of " this age 
of speed and rush and efficiency and mechanics" and said 
that " the thing we are interested in the long run is not 
mechanics or machinery, but men ." A. L. Berres, secretary 
of the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation 
of Labor (AFL). also rejected the prevalent conception of 
the 1920s that " the business of America was business." He 
told the conference that the AFL opposed the use of 
tetraethyl lead, saying, " We feel that where the health and 
general welfare of humanit y is concerned , we ought to step 
slowly." But it was Yandell Henderson who sum marized the 
opponents' position and delineated the course for future 
policy makers . In a private letter to R. R. Sayers of the 
Bureau of Mines, he said , " In the past , Ihe position taken by 
the authorities has been that nothing could be prohibited 
until it was proved to have killed a number of people. I trust 
that in the future. especiall y in a matter of th is sort , the 
posit ion will be that a substance like tetraethyl lead can not 
be introduced for general use until it is proved harm-
less. "68 ,M 
For the vast majority of public health experts at the 
conference , the problem was how to reconcile the opposing 
views of advocates of industrial progress and those fright-
ened by the potential for disaster. Although everyone hoped 
that science itself would provide an answer to th is imponder-
able dilemma, the reaJ ity was that 311 evidence to this point 
was ambiguous. One major problem was that. in the 1920s. 
no one had a model for explaining the apparently idiosyn-
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cratic occurrence of lead poisoning. Even the medical direc-
tor of Reconstruction Hospital in New York , probably Ihe 
only fac il ity at that time devoted exclusively 10 the study and 
treatment of occupational disease and accidents, could not 
explain the strange manifestations of chronic tetraethyllead 
poisoning. Of the 39 patients he treated arler the Bayway 
disaster, he said , " some of these individuals gave no physi-
cal evidence and no symptom or any evidence that could be 
found by a physical examination that would indicate that 
they were ill , but at the same time showed lead in Ihe 
stools." He concluded that " perhaps a man may be poi-
soned from the tetraethyl lead without showing clinical 
evidence and that therefore , there may be a considerable 
number of individuals so poisoned who have not come under 
observation." The policy implications for him were that 
leaded gasoline "should be withheld from public consump-
tion unt il it is conclusively shown that it is not poisonous. "69 
Dr. Alice Hamilton, one of the country 's foremost 
authorit ies on lead , agreed with those opposed to tetraethyl 
lead . At the conference she expressed her belief that the 
environmental health issues were far more important than 
the occupational health and safety issues, adding that she 
doubted that any effective measures could be implemented 
to protect the general public from the hazards of widepsread 
use of leaded gasoline. " You may control conditions within 
a factory," she said, " but how are you going to control the 
whole count ry?" In an extended commentary after the 
conference on the issues that it raised, Hamilton stated, " I 
am not one of those who believe that the use of this leaded 
gasoline can ever be made safe . No lead industry has ever, 
even under the strictest control, lost all its dangers. Where 
there is lead some case of lead poisoning sooner or later 
develops , even under the strictest supervision. " 10-12 
Furlher Tesls. Siudies Urged 
Most public health professionals did not agree with 
Henderson and Hamilton, however. Many took the position 
that it was unfair to ban this new gaso l.ine additive until 
defin itive proof exis ted that it was a real danger. In the face 
of industry arguments that oil supplies were limited and that 
there was an extraordinary need to conserve fuel by making 
combustion more efficient , most public health workers be-
lieved that there should be overwhelming evidence that 
leaded gasoline actua lly harmed people before it was 
banned. Dr. Henry F. Vaughan, president of the American 
Public Heal th Association, said that such evidence did not 
exist. "Cen ainl y in a stud y of the statistics in our large cities 
there is nothing which would warrant a health commissioner 
in saying that you could not sell ethyl gasoline, " he pointed 
out. Vaughan acknowledged that there should be further 
tests and studies of the problem but that " so far as Ihe 
present situat ion is concerned, as a health administrator I 
feel that it is enti rely negative." Emery Hayhurst also 
argued this point at the Surgeon General's Conference, 
maintain ing that the widespread use of leaded gasoline for 27 
months " should have sufficed to bring out some mishaps and 
poisonings , suspected to have been caused by tetraethyl 
lead. "13-1S 
While Hayhurst and other ex perts publicly supported 
the use of leaded gasoline, many of them voiced serious 
doubts in private . One investigator from Columbia Universi-
ty. Frederick Flinn, articulated his fears in a personal 
communication to R. R. Sayers of the United States Public 
Health Service and the Bureau of Mines, saying " The more I 
work with the material [tetraethyl lead] the more I am 
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confused as to whether it is a real public health hazard ." He 
felt that much depended upon the special conditions of 
exposure in industry and on the street but in the end stated 
he was "convinced that there is some hazard-the extent of 
which must be studied around garages and fiUing stations 
over a period of time and by unprejudiced persons." Given 
the fact that Flinn did his study for the Ethyl Corporation, it 
is not surprising that he ended his letter by saying, "of 
course, you must understand that my remarks are confiden-
tial. " Emery Hayhurst was even more candid in his private 
correspondence to Sayers. He told Sayers of a leller he 
received from Dr. Thompson of the Public Health Service 
saying that " lead has no business in the human body .... 
That everyone agrees lead is an undesirable hazard and the 
only way to control it is to stop its use by the general 
public." Hayhurst acknowledged to Sayers, however) that 
political and economic considerations influenced his scien-
tific judgment. " PersonaJl y I can quite agree with Dr. 
Thompson's wholesome point of view, but still I am afraid 
human progress cannot go on under such restrictions and 
thaI where things can be handled safely by proper supervi-
sion and regulation they must be allowed to proceed if we are 
to survive among the nations. Dr. Thompson's arguments 
might also be applied to gasoline and to the thousand and one 
other poisons and hazards which characterize our modern 
civilization. "76.77 
Company Suspends Manufacture. Sales 
Blue Ribbon Commiltee 10 Investigate 
Despite the widespread ambivalence on the pan of 
public health professionals and the opposi tion to any curbs 
on production on the part of industry spokespeople, the 
public suspicions aroused by the preceding year's events led 
to a significant victory for those who opposed the sale of 
leaded gasoline. AI Ihe end of the conference, the Ethyl 
Corporation announced that it was suspending the produc-
tion and distribution of leaded gasoline until the scientific 
and public heahh issues involved in its manufacture could be 
resolved. The conference also called upon the Surgeon 
General to organize a blue ribbon committee of the nation 's 
foremost public health scientists to conduct an invest igat ion 
of leaded gasoline. Among those asked to part icipate were 
David Edsall of Harvard University, Julius Steiglitz of the 
University of Chicago, C.-E. A. Winslow of Yale UniversilY 
and the American Public Health Association. For Alice 
Hamilton and other opponents of leaded gasoline, the con-
ference appeared to be a major victory for it wrested from 
industry the power to decide on the future of an important 
industrial poison, and placed it in the hands of university 
scientists. "To anyone who had followed the course of 
industrial medicine for as much as ten years," Alice Hamil-
ton remarked one month afte r the conference, "this confer-
ence marks a great progress from the days when we used to 
meet the underlings of the great munition makers [during 
World War J] and coax and plead with them to put in the 
precautionary measures .... This time it was possible to 
bring together in the office of the Surgeon General the 
foremost men in indu strial medic ine and public health and 
the men who are in real authority in industry and to have a 
blaze of publicity turned on their deliberations. " 7' 
The initial euphoria over tbe apparent victory of"objec-
tive" science over political and economic self-interest was 
short lived. The blue ribbon committee, mandated to deliver 
an early decision, designed a short-term and, in retrospect, 
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very limited , study of garage and filling station attendants 
and chauffeurs in Dayton and Cincinnati . The study consist-
ed of four groups of workers, 252 people in all. Of Ihese, 36 
men were controls employed by the CilY of Dayton as 
chauffeurs of cars using gasoline wi thout lead while 77 were 
chauffeurs using leaded gasoline over a period of two years. 
Also, 21 olhers were controls employed as garage workers or 
filling station attendants where unleaded gasoline was used 
and 57 were engaged in similar work where tetraethyl gas 
was used. As another means of comparison , 61 men were 
tested in two industrial plants known to have serious expo-
sure to lead dust. As a result of their study , the committee 
concluded seven months after the conference that "in its 
opinion there are at present no good grounds for prohibiting 
the use of ethyl gasoli ne ... provided that its distribution 
and use are controlled by proper regulations. " They suggest-
ed that the Surgeon General formulate specific regulations 
with enforcement by the stales .' '-'''' Ahhough it appears thaI 
the committee rushed to judgment in only seven months , it 
must be pointed out that this group saw their study as only 
an interim repOrl , to be followed by longer range follow-up 
studies in ensuing years. In their final report to the Surgeon 
General , the committee warned: 
"it remains possible thai if the use of leaded gasoline 
becomes widespread conditions may arise very different from 
those studied by us which would render its use more of a 
hazard than would appear to be the case from this investiga-
tion . Longer experience may show that even such slight 
storage of lead as was obse rved in these studies may lead 
eventuall y in suscept ible ind ividuals to recogni zable or to 
chronic degenerative diseases of a less obvious character." 
Recognizing that their short-term investigation was in-
capable of detecting such danger , the committee concluded 
that further study by the government was essential: 
" In view of such possibilit ies the committee feels that 
the investigalion begun under their direction must not be 
aJ lowed 10 lapse ... . It should be possible to follow closely 
the outcome of a more extended use of this fuel and to 
determine whether or not it may const itute a menace 10 Ihe 
health of the general public after prolonged use or other 
conditions not now foreseen . ... The vast increase in the 
number of automobiles throughout the country makes the 
study of all such questions a matter of real importance from 
the standpoint of public health and the committee urges 
strongly that a suitable appropriation be requested from 
Congress for the continuance of these investigations under 
the supervi sion of the Surgeon General of the Public Health 
Service. "&1-8<1 
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These suggestions were never carried out and subse· 
quent studies of the use of tetraethyllead were conducted by 
the Ethyl Corporation and scientists employed by them. 8' .86 
In direct contradiction to the recommendations of the com· 
mittee, Robert Kehoe who carried out the studies for Ethyl, 
wrote : "as it appeared from their investigation that there 
was no evidence of immediate danger to the public health, it 
was thought that these necessarily extensive studies should 
not be repeated at present , at public expense. but that they 
should be continued at the expense of the industry most 
concerned , subject, however, to the supervision of the 
Public Health Service." It should not be surprising that 
Kehoe concluded that his study "fails to show any evidence 
for the existence of such hazards. "117 
Whllf Weill Wrong? 
Today , looking back at the controversy ofthe 1 920s , we 
may be tempted to look askance at public health profession-
als of the period who put their faith in the ability of scientific 
investigations to settle this thorny political and economic 
issue , After all , those like Alice Hamilton and Yandell 
Henderson who fought the introduction of lead into gasoline 
were the strongest advocates of governmentally sponsored 
scientific study to determine the safety or dangers of tetra· 
ethyl lead, What went wrong? Why is tetraethyl lead still a 
prime source of lead in the environment? Of course. there 
were those who had such an ideological commitment to 
industrial progress that they were willing to put their science 
aside to meet the demands of corporate greed. But , more 
importantly , we should look at those who considered them-
selves to be objective scientific investigators. Ultimately, it 
was impossible to separate their "science" from the de· 
mands of an economy and society that was being built 
around the automobile . How else, then, do we explain public 
health scientists' willingness to conduct a short·term study 
that could not resolve the long·term healt h issues. By 
agreeing to provide quick answers they guaranteed that this 
vital industry would not be disrupted, The symptoms of lead 
accumulation due to exhaust em issions would be unlike 
anything they had previously encountered in industrial popu· 
lations. In the long run , those most affected would not be 
adults. but children, slowly accumulat ing lead . Their suffer· 
ing speaks more to the interlocking relationships between 
science and society than to the absence of a link between 
lead and disease. 
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